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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The evidence tended to show that the fall, rather than the beating, was
responsible for the broken ribs, the immediate cause of death. The
Vermont court recognized the causal connection to be established, as
the delirium which was responsible for the fall was caused by the acts
of the defendant, analysing it as a "cause of a cause" problem.16 The
conviction was reversed on the sole ground that some of the blows were
justified in self-defense and some were not, and it could not be proved
which caused the delirium. The Vermont court held that unless expert
medical testimony was introduced tending to show that the unjustified
blows caused the delirium, the jury was not warranted in so finding and
convicting the accused."
In Little, the court points out that the deceased fell because of his
semiconscious condition, 8 but while it is a step in the analysis, the
result is left to turn on other factors. It is submitted that without the
concurrence of this delirium in producing the falls, the conviction
cannot be supported. If Johnson had been conscious, and had fallen
on a slippery floor, a murder conviction could not properly be sustained.
In conclusion, it appears that the cut-off point of criminal respon-
sibility could have been extended to include the occurrence of the fatal
injuries due to the continuing semiconscious condition of the victim.
However, this circumstance does not lend validity to the action of the
court in the present case. A causal connection supported only by the
mental condition of the victim, stretching over a time period of five
days, seems questionable enough to warrant the full consideration of
the jury. It seems obvious from the reported decision that the jury
received no adequate instruction or emphasis upon the sole factor that
could form a basis for their verdict. The defendant seems entitled to
a new trial with proper jury instructions.
CHARLES B. COOPER
LABOR LAW
Labor Disputes-Federal Pre-emption of Jurisdiction. The doc-
trine of federal pre-emption of jurisdiction over labor disputes was
given a significant application by the Washington Supreme Court in
16 The "cause of a cause" reasoning refers to the intervention of dependent causes,
as opposed to independent causes, leaving the chain of causation unbroken.
17 Concerning the necessity of expert medical testimony as to cause of death to
support a homicide conviction, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 693, 703 (1953). See also
State v. Bozovich, 145 Wash. 227, 259 Pac. 395 (1927). No Washington case has
required expert medical testimony in support of a conviction, but the lack of authority
is probably due to the practice of providing it where there is any doubt as to medical
cause.
Is State v. Little, 57 Wn.2d 516, 522, 358 P.2d 120, 123 (1961).
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1961. In Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 1207,1 the court
held that since the "controversy is within the 'arguably subject' rule of
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon .. ."2 the state courts lacked
jurisdiction to grant an injunction against peaceful picketing.
Plaintiffs were the owners of the Bellevue Square shopping center in
Bellevue, Washington. The center, which is well integrated with the
city's principal business district, consists of from 70 to 80 stores and
shops which plaintiff had leased to nearly as many tenants. J. C.
Penney & Co. held one of these leases and operated a large retail
department store in the shopping center.
The defendant Retail Clerks Union had labor contracts in effect with
the other Penney stores in the greater Seattle area at the time, and
were seeking to induce the employees of the Bellevue store to join their
ranks. When other prior organizing efforts had failed to organize these
employees3 the union set up a picket line on the sidewalk in front of
the Penney store. The pickets, never exceeding three in number,
were at all times peaceful in their manner and they restricted their
activities to the immediate vicinity of Penney's. All picketing was done
on property owned by the plaintiff and not included in Penney's lease.
Signs carried by the pickets requested the public not to "patronize the
non-union employees of this store" and thereby to help persuade these
employees to join the union.
Before commencing an action in superior court of King County, the
plaintiff sought to persuade the pickets to leave the premises, but met
with no success. The lessee, Penney Co., made no effort to remove the
pickets.4 The plaintiff then began an action to enjoin the union from
picketing on property owned by the plaintiff, as the lessor, on the
ground that the picketing constituted a trespass. The superior court,
after finding that it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the contro-
versy, denied the injunction on the ground that the defendant's right of
free speech outweighed the private property interest of the plaintiff in
the circumstances.' The supreme court affirmed the denial of the in-
junction, but for the reason that the state courts were without jurisdic-
tion in the matter. The court relied principally on the Garmon decision"
1 158 Wash. Dec. 433, 363 P.2d 803 (1961).
2 Id. at 437, 363 P.2d at 805.
3 The store employed approximately 30 full-time, permanent employees. After at-
tempting for several months to organize the employees, only five had joined the union
at the time the picketing began. Brief for Respondents, pp. 13-15.
4 Id. at pp. 13-14.
Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1207, 38 CCH LAB. CAs. 1 68,674 (1959).
0 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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for its holding that state jurisdiction had been pre-empted. The scope
of this Note is confined to the issue of pre-emption of jurisdiction, and
does not extend to the question of free speech.
The Garmon case, decided in 1959, established the "arguably sub-
ject" rule as follows: "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or
§ 8 of the [National Labor Relations] Act, the States as well as the
federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National
Labor Relations Board.... ." Section seven describes those activities of
employees which are protected from employer interference; section
eight describes those activities of both employers and unions which are
prohibited as unfair labor practices. The supreme court was of the
opinion that the picketing conducted by the Retail Clerks Union was
arguably subject to section seven and to section eight, subsections (b)
(1), (4) and (7).8
The case law background establishing the precedents for resolving
pre-emption problems has involved actions in which the plaintiff has
been picketed by the defendant union. The factual pattern in Freeman
is unique in that the picketing was directed against a non-litigant party;
the two parties to the action were related only through their respective
business relationships with the picketed lessee, J. C. Penney & Co. The
decision's significance lies in its illustration of a type of situation over
which the state will no longer entertain jurisdiction. It substantially
enlarges that area of labor law closed to state jurisdiction by the federal
pre-emption doctrine.
The superior court was of the opinion that "much has been left to
the states even in the direct field of relations between a primary em-
ployer and his employees"' and that therefore even more was left to the
states in the factual situation at bar, where the litigants did not stand
in the relationship of "primary employer and his employees." Alluding
to the widely accepted policy favoring national uniformity of the labor
laws, the court reasoned that this uniformity would be achieved
whether the law was applied by state or federal courts, and that "cer-
tainly it cannot now be said that Congress intended to leave the indi-
vidual citizens of the fifty sovereign states exposed in a no-man's land
7 Id. at 245.8 Section seven guarantees the right to engage in concerted activities toward the
ends of self-organization and collective bargaining. The cited subsections of section
eight prohibit the following unfair labor practices by labor organizations: (b) (1)-
restraining or coercing employees in their rights as guaranteed by section seven;
(b) (4)--engaging in or inducing secondary strikes and boycotts in certain situations;
(b) (7)-picketing in certain instances by an uncertified union.
9 38 CCH LAB. CAS. 11 68,674, 68,676 (1959).
[VoL. 37
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awaiting the decision of... [an] administrative tribunal to decide
whether or not it will assume jurisdiction.""0
To be sure, the effect of federal pre-emption of jurisdiction from the
states was to create the so-called "no-man's land" where, because the
National Labor Relations Board declined to exercise its jurisdiction, no
relief was available."1 The only choice open to the Court was to create,
by its decisions, the "no-man's land," or to allow state court action to
influence the shaping of the labor law in the United States. The former
alternative was chosen in 1957 in Guss v. Utak LRB, 2 the Court stating
its awareness of the problem.
Two years later, in the Garmon case,"8 the United States Supreme
Court applied this principle in denying jurisdiction to the California
courts to award either legal or equitable relief against peaceful picket-
ing. The court again recognized in Garmon, that its decision would
have a marked significance on the issue of pre-emption. 4
In view of the Guss and Garmon decisions the trial court had little to
support its claim to jurisdiction. Even when it is considered that the
no-man's land problem had been eliminated in the period between the
Garmon and Freeman cases," the trial court's holding seems improper.
No appeal for a Board determination had been made by the parties,
and therefore no express rejection of jurisdiction had been made. There
was no doubt that the jurisdictional standard fashioned by the Board
had been met; J. C. Penney & Co. easily exceeded the $500,000 gross
annual volume established in 1958 as the minimum for retail stores."
Garmon announces the rule that no state action can be commenced
when an activity is arguably subject to either section seven or section
10 Id. at 68,677.
11 Many articles have appeared describing the "no-man's land" problem. For two
of the more thorough analyses, see McCoid, Notes on a G-String, 44 Mmi.. L. REv.
205 (1960) ; Cox, The Landrmn-Grfffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, Id. at 257, 261.
12353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957).
13 Guss was decided March 25, 1957. The decision in Garmon was handed down
April 20, 1959, nearly eight months prior to the superior court's decision in Freeman,
December 8, 1959.
14 See ir. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in which he predicts that the case
will become a pre-emption landmark. 359 U.S. 236, 249-50 (1959).
15 Section 701 (c) (2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griffin Amendment), which abrogated the no-man's land problem, took
effect November 13, 1959. This section is an amendment to the 1947 Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), section 14(c) (2), 61 Stat. 101 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 164(c) (2).
1ONLRB, 23D ANN. REP. 8 (1958). This jurisdictional standard determines
whether the Board will accept jurisdiction of the case; at the present time, where the
employer's gross dollar volume falls below the minimum, the Board will not acceptjurisdiction, thus allowing state courts to take jurisdiction under section 701(c) (2)
of the LMIRDA.
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eight of the Labor Management Relations Act until there has been a
clear determination by the NLRB that its jurisdiction is not exclusive.
Where the jurisdictional standards are not satisfied, the 1959 Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act eliminates the requirement
for such a clear determination by the Board 7 and the states may take
jurisdiction just as if that determination had been expressly announced
by the Board.
The only uncertainty in the rule is the construction to be put to the
term "arguably subject." The Washington court has adopted what
seems to be a reasonable interpretation. This interpretation might be
stated to be that whenever the question of the applicability of either
section seven or section eight of the LMRA can reasonably be raised
or debated, the activity is arguably subject to the Act. Such a con-
struction is in line with the Supreme Court's ideas expressed in Garmon
as to the function of the NLRB: "... . It is essential to the administra-
tion of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to
the... [NLRB]. 118 The broad construction applied by the Washing-
ton court will leave the initial determination with the Board, thus pre-
serving, through the federal process, the national uniformity sought by
Congress.
Shopping centers present a situation in which a lessor, non-party to
the labor controversy, can become a litigant against the picketing
union on behalf of his tenant, a party to the labor controversy. In this
situation the court is presented with the problem of balancing the
shopping center's property rights against the right of the union to
picket the tenants. Should the property right prevail, a practical prob-
lem would undoubtedly arise; immunity from picketing would become
a marketable commodity. The Supreme Court in 1957 in Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc." expressly left this problem
open: "Whether a State may frame and enforce an injunction aimed
narrowly at a trespass of this sort is a question that is not here.""
Counsel for the plaintiff-shopping center, referring to this portion of
the Fairlawn decision, argued that "in principle it would seem as
though the state courts should retain jurisdiction to enjoin trespasses
to land by picketing fully as much as jurisdiction to enjoin trespasses
to the person."" However, trespasses to persons almost by definition
37 Ibid.
18 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1960).
19 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
2OId. at 24.
21 Brief for Appellants, pp. 45-46.
[VOL.. 37
TASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
include either violence or a threat of violence, and may be enjoined on
that basis. On the other hand, trespasses to land are much more apt
to be free of violence or any threat of violence, as in the Freeman case.
The plaintiff was supported, however, by the four-judge minority in
Freeman, which concluded from the majority's holding that:
"... the logic of the pre-emption of jurisdiction, as applied by the
majority, is that trespass means nothing. Given peaceful picketing and
a concern engaged in interstate commerce, then the state courts are
divested of jurisdiction over any controversy which might arise. 2 2
The Garmon decision set forth the principle which settles this point.
After stating its "arguably subject" doctrine, the Court declares:
"[It has not] mattered whether the States have acted through laws of
broad general application rather than towards the governance of indus-
trial relations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to
control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create
potential frustration of national purposes.122 (Emphasis added.)
An action of common-law trespass is a "law of broad general applica-
tion," and its application here would, of course, have governed indus-
trial relations, though perhaps indirectly. The Washington court
appears to have properly applied this portion of the Garmon doctrine
to the Freeman case. The shopping center-trespass situation has, by its
appearance in a few cases, caused some specialized concern to be
expressed in law review articles.25 In view of the general applicability
of pre-emption principles set down in Garmon, and the actual applica-
tion of those principles by the Washington court in Freeman, there is
little basis for expecting the court to accord any special treatment to
this factual situation.
There are a number of exceptions to the pre-emption of jurisdiction.
While a full discussion of them is outside the purpose of this Note, each
will be mentioned briefly to outline the full scope of the operation of
pre-emption and to show that none of them applied to the Freeman
facts.
Exceptions of the more obvious nature are those cases in which (1)
22 158 Wash. Dec. 433, 440, 363 P.2d 803, 807 (1961).
23359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
24 State v. Williams, 37 CCH LAB. CAs. 65,708 (Baltimore Crim. Ct. 1959), 44
LRRM 2357; People v. Mlazo, 44 LRRM 2881 (1959). Nahas v. Local 905, 144 Cal.
App. 2d 808, 301 P.2d 932, 302 P2d 829 (1956), referred to by the Washington court
was not in point. The lessor-landowner in the case was not a party to either the dis-
puted labor activity or the litigation.2 5 Law review articles cited by the Washington court are: Book Note, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1216 (1960) ; Comment, 1960 DuxE L.J. 310; Comment, 10 STAr. L. REv. 694
(1958).
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no interstate commerce is involved;"' (2) the Board's volume-of-busi-
ness standards prerequisite to the acceptance of jurisdiction are not
met; and (3) the NLRA expressly reserves jurisdiction to the states."
Clearly, none of these apply in the Freeman case.
Other exceptions, less objective in nature, are set out in the Garmon
case. The first is termed activity which is "merely a peripheral con-
cern" of the LMRA.2 s Freeman did not involve this peripheral activ-
ity; picketing for organizational purposes is a primary concern of the
Act.
The second exception pointed out in Garmon is that "... where the
regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling
and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional
direction, we cannot infer that Congress had deprived the States of the
power to act." 9 These deeply rooted interests include the prevention
of conduct which is violent, or riotous,"0 or which presents imminent
danger of riot or violence."- Jurisdiction over this type of conduct has
been reserved to the states because ".... the compelling state interest
... in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the
absence of clearly expressed congressional direction."3 2 Conduct of a
violent or imminently violent nature quite clearly cannot be found in
the Freeman facts.
Arguably, the plaintiff was privileged at common law to use force to
expel the pickets as trespassers, and a breach of the peace would be
threatened should the pickets forcefully resist expulsion. This possi-
bility was urged by the plaintiff.3 Short of instituting legal or admin-
istrative proceedings reasonable force was the plaintiff's sole remaining
remedy. In view of the peaceful manner of the picketing, the extent of
the force which the plaintiff would be privileged to use could not be
reasonably considered violence-provoking"4 . Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
26 A thorough discussion of the interstate commerce aspect is given in 35 WAsH.
L. R v. 196 (1960).27This last exception is rarely encountered, and exists only in the area of union-
security agreements, which are beyond the scope of this Note.
28359 U.S. 236, 243. An example of peripheral activity was presented in Association
of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). Internal union affairs were held to
be subject to state jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the NLRB non-exclusive.
29359 U.S. 236, 244.
30 UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
31 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
32 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
33 Brief for Appellants, pp. 45-47.
34 The use of force to remove trespassers is limited by common law to that which
is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. It is limited by statute in Washington
to essentially the same extent. RCW 9.11.040.
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Inc."5 established that where picketing includes violence or threats of
violence, only that violent portion of the picketing may be enjoined by
the states and the peaceful aspects must be left to federal agency juris-
diction unless further peaceful picketing has been rendered impossible.
The conclusion here must be that the defendant union's picketing was
not within the violence exception to the pre-emption doctrine.
Two recent cases decided by the Washington court provide an inter-
esting supplement to Freeman on the pre-emption issue. In State ex rel.
Yellow Cab v. Superior Court"0 the Washington Supreme Court ordered
the superior court to take jurisdiction in a suit to enjoin picketing, on
the ground that interstate commerce was not sufficiently affected to
pass jurisdiction to the NLRB. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed this order per curiam without a written opinion, citing the
Garmon decision. It is apparent that this reversal played a substantial
part in the Freeman decision and in fact foreshadowed it by indicating
the attitude of the federal court regarding the priority of determination
to be accorded the Board.37
Then in Lucas Flour Co. v. Local 174, Teamsters Union 8 the court
recognized the "arguably subject" doctrine, but determined that the
activity in question was not "arguably subject" to either section seven
or eight of the NLRA. The union's activity consisted of a strike pro-
testing the discharge of an employee, allegedly for cause, and the
court's determination seems quite proper. Nothing in those sections
can reasonably be said to protect or to prohibit the strike in question.
Rather, the strike was charged as being in breach of the collective
bargaining agreement, the plaintiff seeking damages for breach of
contract. Damages were awarded on the trial and affirmed by the
court, over the objection of the defendant union that section 301 of the
LMRA" pre-empted state jurisdiction over collective bargaining agree-
ment disputes. The court rejected this contention on the grounds that
section 301 provided a non-exclusive remedy in federal courts, and
does not affect the jurisdiction of state courts. The propriety of that
decision was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court when
Lucas was heard on certiorari."0 The Supreme Court agreed that under
35 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
3053 NVn2d 644, 333 P.2d 924 (1959), rev'd., 361 U.S. 373 (1960).
37A thorough discussion of the Yellow Cab case is found in a Note, 35 WASH. L.
Ruv. 196 (1960).
38156 Wash. Dec. 935 (1960), aff'd, 82 S. Ct. 571 (1962).
3"61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185.40 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 82 Sup.Ct. 571 (1962).
19621
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section 301 the state court had jurisdiction over the controversy and
that the doctrine of federal pre-emption was not relevant. This same
result had been reached just prior to Lucas in Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney.4 The state courts are limited by the Lucas and Dowd cases
to the application of federal law to the controversy. Since the state
law applied by the Washington court gave the same result which would
have been reached under federal law, the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Freeman and Lucas cases provide a good delineation of what the
Washington court considers to be permissible state action in labor
cases, and illustrate the probable disposition of similar future labor
cases in Washington. The two cases furnish a guide which should be
helpful in determining whether given labor conduct is within the
"arguably subject" rule. Lucas is also helpful as an illustration of a
type of labor controversy over which the states may still assert juris-
diction, so long as they apply federal law.2
The effect of the Freeman case on Washington labor law should be a
settling one. The scope of activities reserved for state jurisdiction has
been significantly narrowed to those exceptions recognized by Garmon.
The application of the pre-emption principle on the broad scope pre-
sented in the factual situation leaves few questions unanswered as to
the disposition of this type of labor controversy. The Washington court
has interpreted the "arguably subject" rule very broadly, thus resolving
many uncertain or questionable results in past litigation. 3 It may be
expected that more labor controversies will be left initially to determi-
nation by the NLRB than has been the case in the past.
HAROLD D. JOHNSON
4182 Sup. Ct 519 (1962).
42 There is no reason to expect a change in this availability to states for determina-
tion under section 301, since that section does not empower the administrative agency,
but rather gives jurisdiction to the federal courts, with no mention of priority ofjurisdiction at the federal level. The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Lucas and
Dowd confirm this availability.43 An example is Selles v. Local 174, Teamsters Union, 50 Wn.2d 660, 314 P.2d
456 (1957), cert. deied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958), in which the Washington court allowed
recovery of damages by a union member on the ground that a damages remedy was
not available under federal jurisdiction and that therefore federal jurisdiction was not
exclusive. However, the court also recognized that the defendant union's conduct was
an unfair labor practice and within section eight of the LMRA. The court's recog-
nition of the "arguably subject" rule in Garinon will now result in pre-emption in
future cases with similar factual situations. A difference in remedy under state and
federal jurisdiction will not be sufficient to overcome the "arguably subject" rule. The
Selles case is discussed in Wollett, State Power in Labor Relations, 33 WASH. L.
Ray. 364, 375 (1958) ; Note, 33 WAsH. L. REv. 160 (1958).
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